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SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

County Contracts in Georgia:
"Written and Entered"
By R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The law surrounds the local government contracting process with a
number of requirements.' Some of those requirements go primarily to the
substance of the contract,2 and some deal largely with matters of form. Of
the latter, the two points most often projected are the tangibility of the
agreement and its location in the official records.'
Beginning in 1863 and continuing in 1980, Georgia statutory law has
highlighted both tangibility and location for the contracts of counties.4
Via a single mandate, the historic statute commands that "[a]U contracts
entered into by the ordinary with other persons in behalf of the county
shall be in writing and entered on his minutes."' Over the years the ap* Regents' Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. University of Georgia
(A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard University (LL.M., 1961).
1. See, e.g., Sentell, Some Legal Aspects of Local Governmental Purchasingin Georgia,
16 MERCER L. REV. 371 (1965), reprinted in, R.P. SENTELL, STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GovERNMENT LAW 599 (3d ed. 1977).
2. See, e.g., Sentell, Local Government and Contracts that Bind, 3 GA. L. REv. 546
(1969), reprinted in, R.P. SENTELL, STUDIES IN GEORGIA LoCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 541 (3d ed.

1977).
3. See C.J. ANTIEAU, 4 ANTIEAU's LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 39.09 (1966).
4. The progression of the statute through the various codes was as follows: Code of 1863
§ 465; Code of 1868 § 527; Code of 1873 § 493; Code of 1882 § 493; Code of 1895 § 343; Code
of 1910 § 386; Code of 1933 § 23-1701.
5. GA. CODE ANN. § 23-1701 (1971).
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pellate courts have, on a number of occasions, articulated their views of
the objects served by the mandate: to afford accessible information to the
public on contracts being made by the county;' to apprise taxpayers of
the purposes for which their monies are being expended;7 to allow opportunity for citizen challenge to the county's exercise of power;' to open the
public's business to inspection;' and to protect taxpayers against unauthorized and illegal expenditure agreements. 10
The desirability of such objects is, of course, incontestable. As with
most matters, however, merit tends to turn upon perspective; different
perspectives necessarily radiate tensions which, at the extreme, materialize in controversy. For 117 years, the statutory command on writing and
entering county contracts has yielded its share of litigated controversy.
Perhaps a useful purpose might be served by a brief effort to canvass,
illustrate, and organize some instances of that litigation.
II.
A.

EARLY TIMES

Applications

What appears to be the Georgia Supreme Court's earliest consideration
of the statute is also a dramatic illustration of the mandate's application.
Pritchett v. Inferior Court of Bartow County" presented an action to recover on a county bond, in which the plaintiff attached to his declaration
a copy of the bond that stated its amount, the purpose for which issued,
and the rate of interest, and bore the signatures of the county clerk and
treasurer."2 In highly abbreviated fashion, the court simply cited the statute and said that a bond was not valid unless entered upon the minutes
of the county court. Because "[ilt nowhere appears that any entry of this
contract was ever made on the minutes of the Court,"" the court affirmed
the trial judge's dismissal of the proceeding.
In the formative years, the appellate courts engaged the Pritchett approach to turn away the claims of scores of individuals who had performed assorted services for counties while believing they were acting
under contractual agreements. That was the approach of the supreme
6. Milburn v. Glynn County, 109 Ga. 473, 475, 34 S.E. 848, 849 (1899).
7. Spalding County v. Chamberlin & Co., 130 Ga. 649, 652, 61 S.E. 533, 534 (1908).
8. Douglas v. Austin-Western Rd. Mach. Co., 173 Ga. 386, 388, 160 S.E. 409, 410 (1931)
(Beck, J., dissenting).
9. Graham v. Beacham, 189 Ga. 304, 305, 5 S.E.2d 775, 776 (1939).
10. Moore v. Baker, 85 Ga. App. 234, 238, 68 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1952).
11. 46 Ga. 462 (1872).
12. The bond had been issued to an individual for monies loaned to the county for the
support of soldiers' families.
13. 46 Ga. at 465.
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court in Holliday v. Jackson County1'4 to a physician who had treated a
family of paupers at the order of the county ordinary, 10 and of the court
of appeals in Laurens County v. Thomas' to one who had been elected
"county physician." In the latter case both the election and the salary
appeared in the minutes, but the court deemed the minutes deficient in
failing to disclose the duties of the employment. 7
In Spalding County v. Chamberlin & Co.,18 architects sought recovery
from the county for the preparation of plans for the building of a courthouse. The plaintiffs relied upon an agreement which had been entered
on the minutes of the county commissioners stating the plaintiffs' employment and duties.'9 Reversing the trial judge's refusal to sustain the
county's demurrer, the supreme court emphasized the minutes' failure to
specify what the plaintiffs were to receive for their services.2 0 Rejecting
the plaintiffs' allegations that the fee had been understood and agreed
upon,2" the court reasoned that "[t]o permit a county to be held liable on
a contract when a material part of it is in parol, and only part of it in
'22
Inwriting and on the minutes, would defeat the object of the statute.
court
elaborated,
deed, the
[t]he taxpayers of the county are entitled to know, not only for what
purpose their money is being disbursed, but the amount thereof that is
to be expended for a given purpose, if any amount is agreed upon; and
this statute intended to provide a source from which such information
could be reliably obtained,-that is, through the medium of the contract
2
itself spread upon the public records of the county.

14. 121 Ga. 310, 48 S.E. 947 (1904).
15. The ordinary had written an order accepting the family as paupers and directing the
plaintiff physician to treat them at reasonable charges. The supreme court affirmed the trial
judge's grant of a nonsuit.
16. 6 Ga. App. 568, 65 S.E. 302 (1909).
17. The court reasoned that state statutes did not establish the office of county physician and thus the duties of employment were a material term of the contract which must "in
some definite way" be disclosed by the county minutes. Id. at 569, 65 S.E. at 302.
18. 130 Ga. 649, 61 S.E. 533 (1908).
19. The court agreed that the county resolutions on the minutes evidenced the
employment.
20. The court said that to meet the statutory mandate, "all the material portions of the
contract actually made should be in writing and on the minutes; and if the county employs
any one to perform services and a price is agreed upon, this should appear in the contract
on the minutes." 130 Ga. at 652, 61 S.E. at 534.
21. The plaintiffs alleged an understanding that they were to receive a fee in the amount
of 5% of the contract price of the courthouse.
22. 130 Ga. at 652, 61 S.E. at 534. The court said that "[o]ne of the main objects of the
law is to prevent disputes as to the terms of the contract to which the county is a party
." Id.

23.

Id.
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What controlled the claims of physicians and architects also governed
the county's agreement with an attorney. The plaintiff in James v. Douglas County " sought to recover stated fees for legal services rendered to
the county under a contract of employment.2 5 Affirming a dismissal of the
action, the supreme court noted the absence of evidence that the contract
was in writing or entered upon the county minutes. A petition in a contract action against a county "is not good," said the court, "unless it affirmatively avers that such contract was entered upon the minutes of the
proper authorities in charge of the financial affairs of the county. ' '2 6
In addition to contracts for services, the early courts evidenced few
qualms in applying the statutory mandate to county agreements of other
complexions. For instance, in Carolina Metal Products Co. v. Taliaferro
County,"' the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of a seller's effort to
recover for culvert materials and dump carts supplied to and used by the
county. 8 The plaintiff's petition was defective, held the court, because it
failed to allege a written and entered contract." In Killian v. Cherokee
County,30 the supreme court afforded similar disposition to one claiming
to be a lessee from the county. 1 There the court enjoined the continuing
trespass of the "lessee" with the following rationale: "This contract of
rental was not in writing. It was not spread upon the minutes of the
county commissioner who made it. It was unenforceable and did not bind
' s2
the county.
B.

Status of the "Contract"

Given the seriousness with which the law viewed noncompliance with
the statutory mandate, a necessary by-product was the quandary over the
24. 131 Ga. 270, 62 S.E. 185 (1908).
25. Plaintiff alleged that the county had already received the benefit of the services.
26. 131 Ga. at 270, 62 S.E. at 185. To the same effect, see Garner v. Floyd County, 24
Ga. App. 693, 101 S.E. 918 (1920), where the court of appeals upheld a judgment for the
county sued by one who alleged employment as a "concrete foreman." The court explained
that "[ulpon the trial of the case it appeared that the specific contract with the plaintiff was
not in writing and had never been entered upon the minutes of the board of roads and
revenues...." Id.
27. 28 Ga. App. 57, 110 S.E. 331 (1922).
28. The plaintiff was the transferee of the seller's account and alleged that the county
had made partial payment on the goods.
29. The court said that "[t]he statute is positive as to how and in what way liability of a
county may be fixed." 28 Ga. App. 57, 58, 110 S.E. 331, 332 (1922).
30. 169 Ga. 313, 150 S.E. 158 (1929).
31. The defendant was a former employee of the county and alleged leasing the property
in issue from a former county commissioner.
32. 169 Ga. at 320, 150 S.E. at 162. The court viewed the evidence as failing to disclose
that the county had received any of the fruits of the alleged contract.
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precise status of the agreement in issue. Constituting an early presentation of that quandary, Milburn v. Glynn County"3 was an architect's action on a written contract with the county for services in constructing a
new courthouse."4 Reviewing the detailed and lengthy provisions of the
contract, the supreme court found nothing on the county minutes relating
to those provisions and thus declared "an utter failure to comply" with
the mandate. 5 "The only question left for consideration," continued the
court, was "whether or not this omission to enter of record this contract
renders the same absolutely void, and prevents a recovery thereon by the
plaintiff."3 6 In his opinion for the court, Justice Lewis confessed tension
between his personal views and what he considered to be settled law on
the point. On the one hand, he urged, a distinction should be drawn between a total want of power and an irregular exercise of existing power.
The county's failure to enter the contract came within the latter category,
he argued, and a denial of recourse to those who had acted in good faith
was "a hard rule. '37 Nevertheless, the Justice conceded, the question was
not "an open one" at this point." Recalling the Pritchett decision, he
concluded that unless the pleadings affirmatively demonstrated entry
upon the minutes, the contract-even if good in other respects-was
invalid.39
Still another courthouse construction quagmire spawned a series of
contract-status confrontations for the supreme court. In Jones v. Bank of
Cumming," " the bank sought to mandamus the county ordinary to issue a
warrant for payment of sums to the bank which would reimburse the
bank for advances to one who had constructed a courthouse for the
county." Although the plaintiff's petition failed to show any construction
contract on the county minutes, the trial judge granted the mandamus.
Reversing the trial court's decision, the supreme court conjectured that
the judge had been misled by the personal views of Justice Lewis in the
Milburn case. Emphasizing the actual decision in Milburn, the court recalled that decision's reliance, in turn, upon Pritchett-aholding of inva-

33. 109 Ga. 473, 34 S.E. 848 (1899).
34. After making the contract, the county commissioners decided not to build the
courthouse.
35. 109 Ga. at 475, 34 S.E. at 850.
36. Id. at 475-76, 34 S.E. at 850.
37. Id. at 476, 34 S.E. at 850. The Justice observed that the party contracting with the
county has no control over the minutes.
38. Id. at 477, 34 S.E. at 850.
39. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's dismissal of the action. The court did observe that the county had received no benefits under the contract.
40. 131 Ga. 191, 62 S.E. 68 (1908).
41. The bank alleged a contract between the county and the courthouse builder and a
contract between the builder and the bank.
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lidity even though it appeared that the county had received the full benefit of the agreement." The court offered the following counsel to those
who contracted with counties:
Persons contracting with a county are presumed to know the law in reference to such contracts, and they can protect themselves against repudiation of the contract by the county, after performance on their part, by
refusing to perform until the ordinary, or county commissioners, as the
case may be, have complied with this requirement of the law; and can, if
necessary, enforce compliance therewith by mandamus. 3
The bank, wasting little time in following the supreme court's counsel,
then brought an action to mandamus the ordinary to enter the courthouse construction contract on the county minutes." In affirming the
trial judge's grant of the mandamus, 45 Justice Lumpkin, for a unanimous
supreme court, first rejected the county's argument of delay: "If the duty
once arose, there is no law which made it cease to be a duty until it was
complied with.' 46 The court was equally aloof to the contention that the
original failure to enter rendered the contract absolutely void and that a
subsequent entry would be fruitless. The point in controversy, responded
the court, was whether the contract was now to be entered on the minutes: "It is not necessary to decide what effect such entry will have, or as
47
to whether the contract would then be valid or enforceable.'
Having designated the point not ripe for consideration, Justice
Lumpkin promptly proceeded to consider it.' Despite indications to the
contrary, he urged, the court had not yet foreclosed the question; indeed,
the statutory requirement that written contracts be entered "seems to imply the possibility of having a contract in writing complete before it is
entered on the minutes."' "9Thus, Justice Lumpkin did not think that the
court had "yet decided that the failure of an ordinary to do his duty in
42. The court conceded that nonrecovery was a harsh result but countered with the
point that contract information should be accessible to the public before the party contracting with the county has begun to perform.
43. 131 Ga. at 196, 62 S.E. at 70.
44. Jones v. Bank of Cumming, 131 Ga. 614, 63 S.E. 36 (1908).
45. The court however refused to mandamus the ordinary to also enter upon his minutes
the order given by the builder to the bank.
46. 131 Ga. at 618, 63 S.E. at 38. "Certainly the continued neglect on the part of an
officer to discharge an official duty resting upon him does not cause the duty to terminate."

Id.
47. Id. at 620, 63 S.E. at 39. "All the Justices concur in holding that the mandamus
absolute was properly granted as to this contract, without deciding what effect such entry
would have, or what defenses might be made to the contract, if suit were brought upon it."
Id. at 621-22, 63 S.E. at 39.
48. He expressly spoke only for himself on this point.
49. 131 Ga. at 622, 63 S.E. at 40.
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recording a contract promptly, however wrong it may be, renders such
contract an absolute nullity." 50 Conceding the Pritchettopinion's description of such contracts as "invalid," Justice Lumpkin opined that "that
word is not always used in the sense of describing an absolute nullity."5 1
Taking solace in the personal qualms of Justice Lewis in the Milburn
case, Lumpkin concluded by posing the following query:
At what point did the failure of the ordinary to perform his duty, as the
public may presume he will do, render his written contract an absolute
nullity? If the contract was "invalid" until recorded, only in the sense
that it was not perfected or completed in matter of formal entry, so as to
form a basis for a suit, could the county get the courthouse and use it,
and when called on to pay, respond that its official made the contract in
writing but failed to record it, and that if it should now be recorded it
would still be a nullity?"
The Lumpkin query in the second Jones case was not to go long unanswered. Wagener v. Forsyth County's was the third episode arising from
the same controversy; there the courthouse builder sued the county in
behalf of the bank on the now-recorded construction contract." The controlling question, said the court, was whether the entry of the contract on
the minutes, subsequent to completion of the work and under order of
mandamus, afforded the builder the same contractual rights he would
have possessed had entry been made at the time of the agreement. Reversing the trial judge,55 the court quoted from Justice Lumpkin's
predelictions in Jones and concluded that
the contract was not absolutely void or invalid before it was recorded,
except "in the sense that it was not perfected or completed ...

so as to

form a basis for a suit;" and when that defect in the contract had been
remedied, either by the voluntary act of the ordinary in entering it upon
his minutes, or in entering it at the behest of the court, it might, if properly executed by parties having authority to execute it on the part of the
county, and if complied with by the other contracting party, be enforced
50. Id. at 623, 63 S.E. at 40.
51. Id. "A contract may be so imperfect as to be not enforceable, and yet not so absolute
a nullity that it can not be perfected."
52. Id. at 624, 63 S.E. at 40-41. The Justice also spurned the contention that the contract might validly have been recorded only up to the time the builder began work: "The
statute makes no such declaration, and prescribes no time within which the written contract
remains inchoate and at the end of which it will become null because not entered." Id.
53. 135 Ga. 162, 68 S.E. 1115 (1910).
54. The builder pleaded that the bank had advanced money to him in reliance upon the
contract.
55. The judge had held the contract nonenforceable if "kept off the minutes until the
contract was fully executed and the work finished." Id. at 165, 68 S.E. at 116.
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by him just as if it had been entered 5on
the minutes of the ordinary
6
before the commencement of the work.
5
Several years later, in Weathers v. Easterling,
" a county attempted yet
again to defend a mandamus-to-enter action by arguing the illegality of
the contract, at least when the commissioners who executed the contract
were no longer in offilce." Rebuffing that defense, the court dismissed out
of hand the point about successor commissioners 9 and, quoting Justice
Lumpkin extensively, moved directly to the illegal contract contention.
That contention, the court reasoned, was not material to the issue
presented.10 The issue was entry, not validity, and the court held that:

[T]he contract appearing legal upon its face, the successors of the first
commissioners are under the duty of placing the contract on the minutes,
and on their failure to do so they may be compelled by mandamus; and
this would not prevent them from setting up any legal defense they have
as to the invalidity of the contract, if such there be, when suit is brought
by the plaintiff in order to enforce his rights under the contract.81
C.

Qualifications

From the beginning, in one fashion or another, the courts have refused
to apply the written-and-entered requirement to some of the controversies brought before them. Indeed, in the Pritchett era itself, and on strikingly similar facts, the supreme court evolved a qualification upon the
precept. Akin v. Ordinary of Bartow County"' presented an action to re56. 135 Ga. at 166, 68 S.E. at 1117. Otherwise, reasoned the court, it would have been
vain for the court in Jones II to mandamus entry of the contract.
57. 153 Ga. 601, 113 S.E. 152 (1922).
58. The plaintiff alleged the existence of an agreement to perform services for the
county, the county's breach of the contract, and the necessity of having the contract entered
on the minutes before he could maintain an action on it.
59. Otherwise, said the court, "all that would be necessary, in order to avoid being compelled to enter such a contract upon the minutes, would be for the commissioners who were
in office at the time the contract was executed to resign, or delay action on the matter until
their successors were appointed or elected." 153 Ga. at 603, 113 S.E. at 153.
60. "It is not a question for the commissioners to decide as to whether the contract was
illegal and unenforceable, especially when they enter into a contract, but it is a question of
whether the plaintiff, who is a party to the contract, shall have the contract entered upon
the minutes in order that he may bring suit and have determined by a proper tribunal
whether the contract is valid and enforceable." Id. at 604, 113 S.E. at 153.
61. Id. at 606, 113 S.E. at 154. The court affirmed issuance of the mandamus. Later, in
Board of Comm'rs v. MacDougald Constr. Co., 157 Ga. 595, 122 S.E. 317 (1924), the court
held that a mandamus-to-enter action was not a suit upon the contract itself and thus not
within the statutory requirement that petitions in contract actions should incorporate or
attach a copy of the contract. That statutory requirement was repealed by the Ga. Civil
Practice Act of 1966; GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-20(k)(1977).
62. 54 Ga. 59 (1875). The case was decided three years after Pritchett.
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cover on bonds issued by the county in specified amounts, with stated
interest rates, and bearing the signatures of the county clerk and treasurer.0 8 Holding error in the trial judge's charge to the jury on the applicability of the statutory mandate,6 the supreme court restated the
Pritchett precept and took care to explicitly reaffirm it. The court, however, viewed Akin as "an entirely different case."' 5 Both the plaintiff's
declaration and other evidence demonstrated that the county court's authorizing orders were entered upon that court's minutes. "The entry on
the minutes of the inferior court of the orders authorizing and directing
the bonds to be issued, was a compliance with the requirements of the
493d section of the Code. . . ."" Moreover, the court declared, "when
issued as authorized and directed by said orders, and the money received
therefor, as shown by the evidence in the record, it became an executed
contract, which was binding in law upon the county. ....67
The court called yet another situation outside the rule in Central Georgia Power Co. v. Butts County.s s That case reversed the typical positions
of the parties, with the county seeking to enforce an alleged agreement
with a power company regarding the flooding of a county road.6 9 In an
apparent response to the defendant's attempt to avoid responsibility by
brandishing the statutory mandate, the court summarily discovered compliance:7 0 "The written application by the power company, its acceptance
entry of both on the minutes,
by the proper county authorities, and the
7
are sufficient to constitute a contract." '
The court of appeals also quickly proved adept at discovering exceptional circumstances. For instance, in Early County v. Fielder & Allen
Co., 7 1 the county defended a contract claim by admitting the contract but
alleging that the goods purchased from the plaintiff were of insufficient
quality. 73 Emphasizing that the county had filed no demurrer and had
failed to raise the point at the trial, the court held that the county would

63. Just as in Pritchett, the bonds had been issued by the county for the purpose of
acquiring funds for the relief of soldiers' families.
64. The case had gone to the jury, which found a verdict for the defendant county
ordinary.
65. 54 Ga. at 69.
66. Id. at 70.
67. Id.
68. 139 Ga. 490, 77 S.E. 380 (1913).
69. The county alleged its agreement to permit the flooding in return for the power company's pledge to erect bridges and change the location of the road at the company's expense.
70. The court's statement was contained in only a brief headnote.
71. 139 Ga. at 490, 77 S.E. at 380.
72. 4 Ga. App. 268, 63 S.E. 353 (1908).
73. The contract was for the purchase of furniture, and the county admitted that the
furniture had been delivered.
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"not be allowed, after verdict against it, to raise for the first time, on
motion for a new trial, the point that the plaintiff did not prove that the
contract was entered on the minutes of the county commissioners."7
Moreover, in Voris v. Early County,75 even a timely county demurrer was
of no avail. In that case, the court sustained a claim made upon a county
warrant which had been issued to pay for materials used in repairing the
county roads. 70 The court disposed of the county demurrer-alleging that
the contract for the purchase of the materials was not in writing and on
the minutes-by engaging a presumption "that in the drawing of a county
warrant all the officers concerned therewith have performed their duty."7
A contention
otherwise, said the court, "is a matter for answer and not
7' 8
demurrer.

The supreme court then returned to the scene in Americus Grocery Co.
v. Pitts Banking Co., 79 still another controversy arising from the issuance

of county warrants. In that case, the holder of warrants sought to mandamus the payment of interest, and the defendant countered with the contention that the interest provision had not been entered on the minutes
of the county commissioners."0 The court's entire rationale for rejecting
the defendant's position was as follows:
The contrary not being shown, it will be presumed that county warrants

when issued are based upon a valid contract duly recorded as provided in
the Civil Code, § 386. The failure to so record is a matter of defense
against payment, when suit is brought on such warrants and not upon
the contract itself.8 1
D. Summary
The formative years of judicially evolving the statutory mandate that
county contracts be written and entered were lively and impressive ones.
74. 4 Ga. App. at 268, 63 S.E. at 354. "The admission of a party that he made 'a contract' will, in the absence of explanation, limitation, or exception, be construed to mean that
he made a valid, binding contract, executed with the formality required by law." Id.
75. 25 Ga. App. 650, 104 S.E. 89 (1920).
76. The petitioners alleged that they had possesson of a county warrant issued for a
lawful purpose by the county commissioners, and that sufficient funds had been raised during the year by the county for payment of the warrant.
77. 25 Ga. App. at 650, 104 S.E. at 89.
78. Id.
79. 169 Ga. 70, 149 S.E. 776 (1929).
80. The plaintiff sought to require the county depository to pay the interest on the warrants and, if no funds for payment were available, to require the county commissioners to
levy a tax for that purpose. By demurrer, only the bank depository was left as a proper
defendant.
81. 169 Ga. at 71, 149 S.E. at 779. The trial court's issuance of the mandamus was affirmed. This case was later overruled on other grounds.
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Following by only a few years the occasion of the mandate's placement in
the code, the supreme court afforded the command forceful application in
the Pritchett case. The Pritchett precept promptly became grist for the
mills of both appellate courts as they spurned scores of litigated claims
for a wide assortment of services and materials provided to counties by
suppliers who professed to act under contractual agreements. In that line
of cases, the courts' responses to all were unrelenting: if the county minutes did not fully reflect the existence and content of the agreement, then
that agreement was "invalid" and "unenforceable." That response also
applied to the pleading stage of litigation, and claimants' petitions that
failed to affirmatively allege county compliance with the mandate consistently fell victims to dismissal.
No sooner had the courts adopted the Pritchett position than they
were forced to consider the status of the "invalid" agreement. As early as
Milburn, Justice Lewis openly confessed his personal reservations about
the "hard rule," at least in instances where the agreement was in writing.
Later opinions then seized upon those reservations as a platform for
counseling those who dealt with counties to delay performances until the
county had met the mandate, under mandamus if necessary. In the second Jones case, Justice Lumpkin took up the cause by mandamusing the
entrance of the written agreement upon the county minutes and by individually opining that the "invalid" agreement was thus snatched from the
jaws of absolute nullity. Subscribing to the suggestion of Justice
Lumpkin, the court quickly moved to allow enforcement of the "invalid"
agreement although its entry upon the minutes had come only through
mandamus and long after the claimant's performance. The court was
later to rationalize that mandamus of the entry did not prevent the
county from setting up any legal defense to the contract; of course, that
defense could no longer include the point that the contract was not entered upon the minutes.
Equally unsettling was the development of still another line of cases
which appeared to project exceptions to the rule. Almost from the beginning, the Pritchettprecept was analytically defanged in a number of situations. In some, the courts appeared to engage in a "substantial compliance" exercise; in others, they simply designated the precept immaterial.
The latter focused particularly upon county warrants where the courts
employed significantly permissive presumptions of validity in order to relegate the mandate to a matter of defense (rather than demurrer) in actions upon the underlying contracts themselves.
Clearly, much remained for clarification.
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THE MIDDLE AGES

Applications

For approximately the next twenty years (1930-1950) the Georgia
courts continued the evolution of the mandate on all fronts. Its application was a matter of routine and summary declaration on numerous occasions and in a plethora of predicaments."s
A major area of continued application was that of contracts for services.
In the 1931 case of Ward v. State Highway Board,8s for instance, the
supreme court took pointed issue with the trial judge over the mandate's
coverage of a county's oral agreement with a contractor for road construction." Rejecting out of hand the trial judge's position that the statute
"was not intended to prevent the county authorities from hiring laborers
to perform work on the county roads,"85 the court declared the agreement
illegal, "it being in parol and not entered on the minutes, and consequently not complying with the mandatory requirement of the section. ..

."' At virtually the same time, the court of appeals was equally

7 a controversy focusing on
unyielding in Murray County v. Pickering,"
the validity of the county's oral agreement with an attorney. 8 Conceding
that the county had entered a resolution upon its minutes which purported to employ the attorney for representation in a specific case upon
stated terms and conditions, and that the attorney had already tendered
performance of the agreement, the court nevertheless invalidated the contract."9 By way of headnote pronouncement, the court simply concluded
that "[a] mere oral agreement is unenforceable even though it be embodied or recited in a resolution adopted by the county commissioners and

82. An apt threshold example is the 1930 case, Spears v. Robertson, 170 Ga. 368, 152
S.E. 903 (1930), in which the supreme court, without even a hint as to the facts of the case,

quoted the statute and concluded as follows: "Under the law embraced in that section of the
code, and in view of the construction placed upon it in numerous cases decided by this
court, a suit based upon an alleged contract with the county can not prevail where it is not
shown that there has been compliance with that section of the code. In the present case it
does not appear that there has been compliance with the above provisions of the code; and
it necessarily follows that the court did not err in granting a nonsuit." Id.
83. 172 Ga. 414, 157 S.E. 328 (1931).
84. The case presented an action by landowners to enjoin the relocation of a road, and
one of the attacks went to the validity of the county's contract with the road construction
contractor.
85. 172 Ga. at 420, 157 S.E. at 331.
86. Id. at 421, 157 S.E. at 331.
87. 42 Ga. App. 739, 157 S.E. 343 (1931).
88. The court dismissed the attorney's effort to prosecute the case for the county in
order to recover his attorney fees from the defendant.
89. The court said simply that this resolution was insufficient to constitute a binding
contract between the county and the attorney.
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entered on the minutes. "
This unwavering judicial approach forcefully condemned the position
of the county deputy warden in Graham v. Beacham," who sought to
mandamus the county commissioners to pay his monthly salary."s Highlighting the plaintiff's failure to allege a written and entered contract, the
supreme court resoundingly emphasized the importance of the statutory
mandate."s Its purpose was to open the public's business to inspection,
explained the court, and full compliance was a necessity. Indeed,
[any negotiations or oral agreements, or even written agreements that
have not been entered on the minutes, fall short of being valid contracts
conferring any right upon such party, and will not constitute a basis for
an action against the county. These essential requirements of a valid contract with the county can not be waived. The mandate of this law is absolute and applicable to each and every contract made and executed on
behalf of the county; and to be valid and enforceable every contract must
conform to these essential requirements."
The plaintiff's action being based on contract, "and not on right to salary
as fixed by or in pursuance of law,"'9 5 the court's dismissal on demurrer
appeared to be an automatic response."
Aside from contracts for services, the courts applied the statutory re-

quirement to a variety of other county agreements. One illustration was
Sosebee v. Hall County,97 in which the court of appeals considered the
claim of a property owner who had executed a right-of-way deed to the
county in return for the county's agreement to move and restore a building. Seeking damages for the county's alleged breach of the agreement,"
the plaintiff failed to assert that the contract had been written and en90. 42 Ga. App. at 739, 157 S.E. at 343.
91. 189 Ga 304, 5 S.E.2d 775 (1939).
92. The plaintiff alleged a contract of appointment and indeed the county's payment of
his salary except for one stated month.
93. "A suit against the county, based upon an alleged contract with the county, is defective unless it be alleged that such contract is in writing and has been entered on the minutes
as required by the statute." 189 Ga. at 306, 5 S.E.2d at 776.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Similarly conclusive, in McGinty v. Pickering, 180 Ga. 447, 179 S.E. 358 (1935), the
court enjoined county commissioners from disbursing funds to one whom they had verbally
employed to handle a road construction project. Without further elaboration, the court said,
"It appears from the record that Pickering is acting as agent of the county without right,
because there is no recorded contract between him and the county, establishing such relation." Id. at 454, 179 S.E. at 362.
97. 50 Ga. App. 21, 177 S.E. 71 (1934).
98. The plaintiff alleged that the county moved the building, damaged it, and refused to
restore it as agreed.
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tered." Holding that failure to be fatal, 00 the court termed compliance
with the statute "a condition precedent to the existence of a valid and
enforceable contract against the county. .. .
Contracts for goods remained equally susceptible to the precept, a
point classically demonstrated by Griffin v. Maddox.'0 2 In that case,
plaintiff attempted to compel the county to levy a tax for the payment of
a warrant for bridge materials which the seller had delivered upon the
county's oral order. Affirming a directed verdict for the county, the supreme court relied exclusively upon the following rationale: "The contract
for the purchase of the material was never reduced to writing and entered
on the minutes."'' 08
Toward the conclusion of the period under survey, the court employed
its same summary manner of disposition in Hobbs v. Howell.'" There
taxpayers sought to enjoin the county from expending funds in acquiring
a road right-of-way, alleging that the county had entered into "valid and
binding contracts" to pay the grantors for incidental expenses. 0 5 The
court quoted the statute and dismissed the taxpayers' efforts with the
following benediction: "A petition is subject to general demurrer which
alleges that contracts have been entered into with a county but which
fails to allege that the contracts were in writing and entered on the minutes of the proper county authority."' 1 6
B. Status of the "Contract"
The mandate's evolution in the "middle ages" included attention to the
status of the "invalid" contract. Again, a single controversy gave rise to a
succession of illustrative litigation episodes.
In the first episode, Douglas v. Austin-Western Road Machinery Co.,"'7
the supreme court outlined the transaction in issue. The chairman of the
county board of commissioners had signed a written order for the
purchase of culvert pipe and had agreed to issue warrants in the amount
of a stated purchase price plus specified interest. The seller had signed a
99. The court observed that the plaintiff had amended her petition in other respects.
100. The court affirmed the trial judge's action in sustaining the county's general
demurrer.
101. 50 Ga. App. at 22-23, 177 S.E. at 72. The court quoted from the supreme court's
opinion in Pritchett.
102. 181 Ga. 492, 182 S.E. 847 (1935).
103. Id. at 492, 182 S.E. at 848.
104. 204 Ga. 370, 49 S.E.2d 827 (1948).
105. Id. at 370, 49 S.E.2d at 828. The plaintiffs alleged those expenses to include such
matters as removing and re-erecting fences and buildings.
106. Id. at 370-71, 49 S.E.2d at 829. Minus such an allegation, said the court, the petition contained only a conclusion and "presents no issuable fact." Id.
107. 173 Ga. 386, 160 S.E. 409 (1931).
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written guarantee of quality and had shipped the pipe. 08 Upon receipt of
the pipe, the county commissioners had issued the warrants, but had
since failed to pay them. 1"
This transaction, the court held, constituted a "contract" within the
meaning of the statutory mandate. Because all parties admitted that the
contract had not been entered upon the county minutes, "the issuance of
the warrants to pay off the purchase-price of the material was illegal." 0
Accordingly, the court reversed the trial judge's issuance of a mandamus
compelling the county commissioners to levy taxes in an amount sufficient to satisfy the warrants.'
Concurrently with its effort to mandamus taxation, and in a separate
proceeding, the seller also sought to compel entry of the written contract
upon the county minutes. The latter effort reached the supreme court in
the second case of Douglas v. Austin-Western Road Machinery Co.,'"
with the seller forthrightly contending that "petitioner can not bring suit
on its contract for said breach until said contract is entered on the minutes of the commissioners."" 8 This effort found the court in a more receptive frame:
Where a person has a written contract with a county, he has the legal
right to have the same entered on such minutes; and if the proper county
authorities fail or refuse to enter such contract, the judge of the superior
court should by mandamus compel the authorities to so enter it."'
Even so, the court continued to limit the issue for determination: "In a
proceeding for mandamus to compel the performance of such duty, the
court will not inquire into the validity of the contract further than to see
that on its face it is prima facie valid.""' 5 In this case, the court resolved,
the papers in issue purported to evidence a prima facie contract for the
108. Both agreements were apparently included in a single order form.
109. Indeed, in the succeeding years the commissioners had failed to levy any taxes for
road purposes.
110. 173 Ga. at 387, 160 S.E. at 409.
111. The court designated the trial judge's ruling "a fundamental error." In dissent, Justice Beck contended that the transaction was not a "contract" within the meaning of the
statute. The purpose of the statute, he urged was to put citizens and taxpayers on notice of
executory county contracts so that challenge could be made to those not authorized by law.
This transaction, Beck maintained, "amounted merely to a sale and purchase, and did not
amount to a contract such as contemplated in section 386 of the Code; and the failure to
enter it on the minutes did not render the same illegal, nor render the warrants for the
consideration illegal." Id. at 389, 160 S.E. at 410.
112. 173 Ga. 834, 161 S.E. 811 (1931). This case was decided by the court approximately
three months after its first Douglas determination.
113. Id. at 836, 161 S.E. at 813.
114. Id. at 838, 161 S.E. at 814.
115. Id.
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116
purchase of the culvert pipe.
With the originally "invalid" contract finally forced upon the county
7
minutes, the seller, in Austin-Western Road Machinery Co. v. Douglas,1
again petitioned to mandamus the commissioners to levy a special tax to
satisfy the warrants. 18 Rejecting the commissioners' demurrer, the court
discovered "a presumption of law" that the warrants had been issued for
a legal indebtedness, and observed that the seller's demand was for "a
liquidated amount." '1 The court continued to qualify, however, by pointing out that "if for any reason the contract is illegal and unenforceable
. . .it may be shown by evidence on the trial. .. .

C.

Qualifications

Throughout this period as well, the courts refused to allow the mandate
to control some of the controversies presented. One such instance was the
court of appeals' consideration in Burke v. Wheeler County 2' of a public
accountant's action to recover on a contract to audit the books of the tax
collector. Although the agreement had been made in 1933, and the audit
then completed, the contract was not entered upon the county minutes
until 1934.' s" Undeterred, the court declared a "sufficient compliance"
with the command: "This statute does not state when the contract must
be entered on the minutes of the ordinary or county commissioner, nor
does it say that it can not be reduced to writing or signed by the parties
at a date after the contract is made."' 2
116. Although the court purported to so limit the extent of its inquiry, it also appeared
to decide that any lack of authorization by the chairman of the commissioners to make the
contract had been waived by the board's acceptance of full performance. Justice Gilbert
found it necessary to concur specially "on the theory that the validity of the contract is not
raised in this suit." Id. at 840, 161 S.E. at 815.
117. 178 Ga. 642, 173 S.E. 386 (1934).
118. Three years had passed since the seller's original effort to mandamus taxation.
119. 178 Ga. at 643, 173 S.E. at 387.
120. Id. The court appeared less charitable in Wood v. Puritan Chem. Co., 178 Ga. 229,
172 S.E. 557 (1934), an action to mandamus a county commissioner to enter upon his minutes an alleged contract with the county warden. There the court sustained the commissioner's demurrers with the headnote observation that "no specific authority is shown to
have been granted by the commissioners to the warden of the chain-gang to execute the
contract which petitioner seeks by mandamus to have entered upon the minutes. The petition must also show that the contract was one executed in virtue of authority which could be
delegated by the proper county officer or officers." Id. at 229-30, 172 S.E. at 557.
121. 54 Ga. App. 81, 187 S.E. 246 (1936).
122. One of the county's defenses was that "the contract was not originally in writing
and put on the minutes, and was illegal and unenforceable." Id. at 83, 187 S.E. at 248.
123. Id. at 84, 187 S.E. at 248. The court relied upon the supreme court's decision in
Wagener v. Forsyth County, 135 Ga. 162, 68 S.E. 1115 (1910). See generally notes 53-56,
supra, and accompanying text.
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The supreme court reached a similar result, via a different route, in
Thompson v. Shurling.'s" There the court affirmed a mandamus requiring
the county treasurer to stamp the plaintiff's warrant as unpaid so that
interest on the warrant could accrue." ' In an apparent response to the
treasurer's contention of unenforceability, the court declared that "[tihe
contrary not being shown, it will be presumed that county warrants when
issued are based upon a valid contract duly recorded as provided in the
Code.""'
By far the most striking qualification upon the mandate was the one
that the supreme court initiated with its 1931 decision in Templeman v.
2 7 Resolution
Jeffries.1
of the controversy in Templeman turned upon the
validity of the county commissioners' appointment of a "county attorney."' s The challenge to that appointment revealed the entry upon the
county minutes of a mere resolution in which the commissioners purported to designate the appointee and fix his term and salary, rather than
the entry of a formal contract signed by both parties. The ground of the
attack was explicit: the appointment was "invalid and void" because it
had not been accomplished by a written contract entered upon the county
minutes.1 ' The court responded by examining the nature of the office of
county attorney. Although neither general nor local statute dealt with the
matter, the court conceded, nevertheless "the commissioners are by clear
implication authorized to employ counsel to defend suits brought against
the county in civil matters."'8 0 Moreover, this implied authority extended
to employment of a "regular county attorney."' 3 ' With the power to appoint so established,""2 the court then turned to the requirement that
county contracts be written and entered: "The relation between the
124. 184 Ga. 836, 193 S.E. 880 (1937).
125. The plaintiff alleged two presentations of the warrant and refusals to pay.
126. 184 Ga. at 836, 193 S.E. at 881. The court relied upon its prior decision in Americus
Grocery Co. v. Pitts Banking Co., 169 Ga. 70, 149 S.E. 776 (1929). See generally notes 79-81,
supra, and accompanying text.
127. 172 Ga. 895, 159 S.E. 248 (1931).
128. The controversy arose over the validity of the composition of a county sanity commission which, under general statute, was to include the county attorney if such an officer
existed. The important issue, therefore, was whether the county commissioners' earlier appointment of a "county attorney" was valid so that the failure to place the attorney on the
sanity commission was fatal.
129. 172 Ga. at 901, 159 S.E. at 251.
130. Id. at 899, 159 S.E. at 251. The court appeared to draw this implication primarily
from the local statute creating the board of county commissioners.
131. Id. at 901, 159 S.E. at 251. The court said that such an attorney could render better
service than one "occasionally employed in the legal business of the county." Id.
132. "The title of the county attorney to his office rests upon an implied legislative
power conferred upon the commissioners, and not upon a contract made by the commissioners and the attorney." Id. at 902, 159 S.E. at 252.
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county and the county attorney does not rest upon contract, but arises
from appointment authorized by a legislative enactment."138 From that
vantage point, however attained, the court then took the analytical leap
to its final destination: "The execution of such power by the passage of
such resolution by the county commissioners does not constitute the making of a contract within the meaning of the section of the code. .. ."
One year later, the court employed its Templeman rationale to decide
Walker v. Stephens, 3 5 a taxpayers' action to enjoin the payment of warrants issued by the county to the county attorney for specified legal services.138 Again, one ground of the proceeding was that the contract with
the attorney "for the rendition of the services was not in writing and recorded upon the minutes of the county commissioners, as required by
law. 1 3 7 Again also, the court found implied authority in the commissioners to appoint the attorney " " "and yet leave the matter of compensation
for services to be determined from time to time according to their actual
worth in view of the circumstances." ' Accordingly,
the relation between the county and the attorney would not rest upon
contract, but would arise from the appointment of the attorney as a public officer, and the transaction would not fall within the purview of section 386 of the Civil Code of 1910, which requires all contracts entered
into by the ordinary or county commissioners with other persons in behalf of the county to be in writing and to be entered upon the minutes of
the ordinary or county commissioners.1 10
The excepting principle constructed by Templeman and Walker then
became the central point of disagreement within the court of appeals
133.

Id. at 901, 159 S.E. at 251.

134. Id. at 902, 159 S.E. at 252.
Under the power to appoint the attorney and fix his salary, the office being created by necessary implication from the statute creating the board of county commissioners, the transaction does not constitute a contract between the county and
the attorney within the meaning of the above section of the code.
Having concluded that the county attorney's appointment was valid, the court proceeded to
hold invalid the composition of the sanity commission in issue.
135. 175 Ga. 405, 165 S.E. 99 (1932).
136. The services involved advising the county in respect to certain tax funds.
137. 175 Ga. at 410, 165 S.E. at 101.
138. The court examined the local statute creating the board of county commissioners.
139. 175 Ga. at 411, 165 S.E. at 102.
140. Id. at 411-12, 165 S.E. at 102. The court thus reversed the trial judge's refusal to
dismiss the taxpayers' proceeding.
In a similar vein, see Board of Educ. v. Young, 187 Ga. 644, 645, 1 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1939),

a decision holding a local school system not subject to the mandate because the validity of
the system was expressly confirmed by the constitution.
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when that court decided Rainey v. Marion County."' In Rainey, the
county commissioners orally employed an attorney to defend the county
against an injunction proceeding and later refused to pay the attorney's
fee. Countering the attorney's action to recover the fee, the commissioners urged plaintiff's failure to show that the contract was written or entered upon the minutes. Sustaining that defense, a majority of the court
of appeals distinguished Templeman and Walker by observing that in
each of those cases "a county attorney was employed to represent the
county generally.
...
'l Here in Rainey, continued the court, the attorney "was employed to represent the county in one case only, which did
not make him the county attorney, and therefore he was not an officer." 4 On this distinction, the court held the employment contract subject to and violative of the statutory mandate and thus "void and
44
unenforceable. 11
The vigorous dissenting opinion in Rainey disagreed, not with the fact
of the distinction, but rather with its materiality." 8 Indeed, the dissent
queried,
why would not this attorney be as much a county attorney and public
officer in so far as the particular matter or litigation for which his services were engaged was concerned, as would some attorney employed in
the same manner but employed by the month or year to represent the
county generally and paid a monthly or yearly compensation for his
services?"
Finding no answer to this query, the dissent deemed Templeman and
1 48
Walker to control 14 and to free the contract from the mandate.
141.

63 Ga. App. 35, 10 S.E.2d 258 (1940).

142.

Id. at 36, 10 S.E.2d at 259.

143.

Id. at 36, 10 S.E.2d at 259-60.

144. Id. The court cited its decision in Murray County v. Pickering, 42 Ga. App. 739, 157
S.E. 343 (1931). See generally notes 87-90, supra, and accompanying text.
145. The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Stephens.
146. 63 Ga. App. at 38, 10 S.E.2d at 260-61.
147. "The reasoning underlying the decision in Walker v. Stephens ... was that the
county authorities could employ a qualified practitioner of the law to represent the county
in a particular litigation, and that in such event the relationship between the county and the
attorney would not rest upon contract but would arise from the appointment of the attorney
as a public officer. The same is true of the case of Templeman v.Jeffries.
10 S.E.2d at 260.

Id. at 37-38,

148. The dissent distinguished Murray County v. Pickering under the view that that
case involved a contract for services which had not been performed by the attorneys. See
generally notes 87-90, supra, and accompanying text.
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Summary

In tracing the judicial evolution of the statutory mandate that county
contracts be written and entered upon the minutes, the "middle ages"
provided instructive perspective. A steady and unyielding line of decisions continued application of the mandate, declaring invalid and unenforceable all manner of agreements for goods, services, and incidentals.
Generally, those declarations were delivered in highly summary fashion
against claimants whose petitions failed to assert compliance. Viewing the
mandate's intended purpose as crucial to effective county government,
the courts deemed the requirement immune from waiver and insisted
upon performance to the letter. The unfortunate plight of the private
party to the agreement typically went unmarked in the opinions.
This is by no means to suggest the arrival of complete analytical tranquility. The existence of a written prima facie contract at least entitled
the claimant to mandamus its entry upon the county minutes. That entry, in turn, would overcome a county demurrer and achieve a trial at
which the claimant could litigate the validity of the contract.
During that same period the courts refused application of the mandate
in some instances. In addition to hints at substantial compliance and presumptions of validity on selected occasions, the courts unfolded an exception to the mandate for "public officers" whose relation to the county
rested upon impliedly authorized "appointment" rather than contract.
Employment agreements between the county and such officers, although
oral and unrecorded, were thus freed from the invalidating blight of the
mandate. Yet, it appeared, not all appointments were qualified appointments; and determining exceptions to the exception became as perplexing
as divining exceptions to the mandate. To a considerable degree, therefore, the clarification crises persisted.
IV.

A.

MODERN MACHINATIONS

Applications

At least one observation on the last thirty years can be advanced with
confidence: there has been no decrease in litigation arising from the statutory mandate that county contracts be written and entered upon the minutes. 4 9 Both appellate courts initiated the era with routine but forceful
50
decisions of application. In Moore v. Baker,1
the court of appeals affirmed dismissal of a petition brought to enforce a county's promise to
compensate for improvements on a right of way conveyed by the plain149.
150.

Generally, the years covered are 1950 to 1980.
85 Ga. App. 234, 68 S.E.2d 911 (1952).
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tiff.' ' Noting the petition's failure to allege that the promise was written
and entered, the court invoked the "purpose" of the mandate: "to protect
the taxpayers against unauthorized and illegal contracts and expenditures
53
of county funds."15 2 In Ferguson v. Randolph County,1
the supreme
court dealt directly with the beneficiaries of that "purpose"; the court
sustained against general demurrers taxpayers' petitions which challenged
the validity of county contracts for road construction. 15' Said the court:
"If such contracts are not in writing and entered on the minutes of the
proper county authority, they are not enforceable." 55
By no means were all the applications routine ones; on the contrary,
recent years have witnessed a rich variety of factual presentations of the
problem. In abbreviated headnote fashion, Floyd v. Thomas'" highlighted the efforts of county commissioners to obtain a dump truck by
authorizing a county employee to negotiate the purchase. At the instance
of taxpayers to enjoin those efforts, 57 the supreme court deemed the arrangement insufficient to meet the statutory mandate and affirmed the
trial judge's restraining order.'"
The mandate precipitated yet another restraining order in City of War5
renton v. Johnson,"'
a county commissioner's effort to enjoin continued
municipal use of county property for the location of a police booth. 60
Observing that the municipality's claim to the property originated from
the county's oral permission almost twenty years earlier,"' the supreme
court proclaimed that "[o]ral contracts on behalf of a county have repeatedly been held to be void, thus the permission here could never ripen into
62
a valid easement."'

151. Plaintiff alleged the county's agreement to pay him "a fair and reasonable value"
for houses and other improvements located on the right-of-way which he conveyed to the
county. Id. at 235, 68 S.E.2d at 912.
152. 85 Ga. App. at 238, 68 S.E.2d at 914.
153. 211 Ga. 103, 84 S.E.2d 70 (1954).
154. Plaintiffs charged that the county commissioners had illegally contracted with one
of their members so that the member would perform road construction contracts which the
county had received from the state highway department.
155. 211 Ga. at 109, 84 S.E.2d at 75.
156. 211 Ga. 656, 87 S.E.2d 846 (1955).
157. The action was to enjoin the commissioners from paying for the truck.
158. The court said the county's authorization to the employee did not designate the
seller nor the price to be paid.
159. 235 Ga. 665, 221 S.E.2d 429 (1975).
160. The municipality sought to restrain the commissioner from removing the booth,
and the commissioner prayed for an injunction against the continued municipal use of the
property.
161. Years later, the municipality had obtained written permission in the form of a letter
and claimed an easement running with the land.
162. 235 Ga. at 666, 221 S.E.2d at 430-31. The court affirmed the trial judge's denial of
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The court of appeals has recently revisited the scene on several occasions. In Lasky v. Fulton County 68 the court considered an action to recover jewelry originally stolen from the plaintiff, recovered by the police,
and which then disappeared from the custody of the county police department. The plaintiff sought to avoid the bar of sovereign immunity by
arguing the existence of a bailment with the county. Affirming the trial
judge's dismissal of the complaint, the court reasoned as follows:
In order to establish the existence of a contractual arrangement the
guidelines of Code § 23-1701 must be met .... Under that section, if the
contract is not in writing and not entered on the proper minutes, it is not
enforceable. . . .Here, it is obvious that the plaintiff made no effort to
come within the above provisions. 1'
In DeKalb County v. Scruggs,"' the mandate was as devastating for
implied contracts as it had been for easements and bailments. In litigation arising out of a construction project, the county was made the target
of a cross claim which included a count seeking recovery in "implied contract" for sevices allegedly rendered to and received by the county., 8 Reversing a judgment for the claimant, the court emphasized that "in order
for a county to be liable in contract there must be [an] authorized, written contract, and it must be entered on the minutes. 11 7 Thus, "it was
error to allow [the contractor] to proceed in implied contract, and a new
trial is ordered."' 5
Finally, the 1979 case of Commercial Credit Corp. v. Mason' provided
modern confirmation of the mandate's continuing impact upon Georgia
local government. In that case the plaintiff alleged the existence of a contract under which it had constructed a sewage treatment facility and the
county had agreed to exempt the plaintiff from payment of a tap-on fee
for connection to an interceptor sewer system. Denying the existence of a
binding contractual relationship between the parties, the court made
short work of rationale: "Assuming arguendo that an otherwise valid written contract exists in this case, appellant has made no showing that such
contract was entered on the minutes of the .. .County Board of Cointhe city prayer for injunctive relief and its grant of the county commissioner's prayer.
163. 145 Ga. App. 120, 243 S.E.2d 330 (1978).
164. Id. at 121, 243 S.E.2d at 331. The court also held the police without power to enter
into a bailment with the plaintiff that would make the county responsible under the
circumstances.
165. 147 Ga. App. 711, 250 S.E.2d 159 (1978).
166. A painting subcontractor sued the contractor and the contractor then cross claimed
against the county under the principal contract.
167. 147 Ga. App. at 712, 250 S.E.2d at 160.
168. Id.
169. 151 Ga. App. 443, 260 S.E.2d 352 (1979).
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missioners as required by law." '
B.

Status of the "Contract"

The events culminating in Malcom v. Fulton County17 ' appeared generally as follows: in 1950 the county commissioners executed a contract
purporting to convey timber to the defendant, but the contract was not
then entered upon the county minutes; at their next meeting the commissioners discussed subsequent offers to purchase the timber and voted to
rescind the contract; 72 the defendant proceeded to cut and remove the
timber until restrained by court order;" " in 1952 the defendant mandamused entry of the contract upon the county minutes, and the county
then sought to enjoin the defendant's trespass and to cancel the
7
contract. 1
Approaching the controversy somewhat cautiously, the supreme court
observed that at the time the defendant first cut and removed the timber
the contract had not been recorded on the official minutes and was thus
unenforceable. " 5 Yet, continued the court, "it is not for want of record
alone necessarily void; and, if otherwise valid, it becomes enforceable
when subsequently recorded.' '17 That point, however, appeared unresponsive to the issue presented: the contract was admittedly originally
unenforceable and while in that status, prior to entry under mandamus,
the commissioners voted to rescind it. If the contract was unenforceable,
why was it not also then rescindable? The court's response was unclear: it
emphasized that the county's claimed right of rescission was based entirely upon its own failure to record and that the contract was subsequently recorded pursuant to the mandamus.17 7 That rationale yielded
170. Id. at 443-44, 260 S.E.2d at 353. The court affirmed the trial judge's decision that
the contract was invalid.
171. 209 Ga. 392, 73 S.E.2d 173 (1952).
172. The commissioners' action was taken upon the express advice of the county attorney that the contract would not be binding until recorded upon the minutes. The commissioners instructed the clerk not to record that contract.
173. The defendant refused to accept the county's proffered refund of the purchase
money which he had previously paid.
174. Other nonconclusive stages of the episode were Malcom v. Aldredge, 208 Ga. 297, 66
S.E.2d 750 (1951) and Malcom v. Webb, 209 Ga. 735, 75 S.E.2d 801 (1953).
175. 209 Ga. at 396, 73 S.E.2d at 176.
176. Id. at 399, 73 S.E.2d at 178.
In other words, a county contract, otherwise valid, is not rendered void, as here
contended, by not being entered of record by those whose duty it is to record it
upon their minutes; but it is, through such failure, rendered unenforceable until it
is recorded, and it is well settled in this State that mandamus will lie to require its
record. Id.
177. The court said that the statutory mandate "fixes no limit of time during which a
county contract may be entered of record." Id. at 399, 73 S.E.2d at 178.
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the following conclusion:
It seems very clear to us that county commissioners cannot make a contract in behalf of the county, fail to record it in discharge of their official
duty, and then rescind it because it is not recorded, as the commissioners
in this case undertook to do. Accordingly, the plaintiff [county] was not
entitled to any of the relief sought upon the ground that the contract
relied on by the defendant was not binding upon the county because it
had been legally rescinded by the county commissioners." 8
The court thus reversed the jury verdict in favor of the county.
Following the court's questionable decision in Malcom v. Fulton
County, citizens and taxpayers launched still another offensive against
the contract in issue, a proceeding which came to fruition three years
later in Malcom v. Webb.' 9 Plaintiffs pursued a joint action against both
the county and the purchaser of the timber, alleging that with knowledge
of higher bids for the timber, the parties had fraudulently attempted a
conveyance for inadequate consideration and that the purported contract
was void. From a jury's decision ordering the contract cancelled, the defendants appealed and the supreme court found itself in familiar factual
surroundings.
The court first rebuffed the defendants' argument of estoppel which
relied upon the decision in Malcom v. Fulton County that the contract
was valid. In the former case the question was one of execution, said the
court, and in this case the issue focused upon alleged fraud. 8 0 On the
point of fraud, the court agreed with the plaintiffs' charges, and employed
the matter of improper execution of the contract to do so. Thus, the court
reasoned that the contract was not valid until entered upon the county
minutes and delivered to the purchaser, and that both parties were
chargeable with notice of those points. Before either entry or delivery,
both parties possessed actual knowledge of higher outstanding offers to
purchase the timber. "With knowledge of all these facts," held the court,
"it was a clear breach of duty, and therefore a legal fraud, for the Commissioners to undertake to sell the timber to Malcom at a price far below
that offered for it by other parties."'8 1 With the conclusion of Malcom v.
Webb, therefore, a county contract judicially declared valid in 1952 was
judicially cancelled in 1955; and five years had elapsed since its original
execution.
178. Id. at 400, 73 S.E.2d at 179.
179. 211 Ga. 449, 86 S.E.2d 489 (1955).
180. Indeed, said the court, no allegations of fraud could have been made in the former
case, "initiated by the county through its County Commissioners, for one will not be permitted in a court of equity to take advantage of its own fraud." Id. at 454, 86 S.E.2d at 494.
181. Id. at 458-59, 86 S.E.2d at 496.
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The scenario of a county's acceptance of one offer only to later receive
a better offer unfolded yet again in Southern Airways Co. v. Williams.182
The events leading up to that case were as follows: the county commissioner in 1940 had leased the county airport to the plaintiff, with the
term suspended until possession was relinquished by the United States
government; 183 neither the written lease nor a 1943 amendment to it were
entered upon the county minutes; 184 the federal government took exclusive possession of the premises prior to the beginning of the lease period
and continued its occupancy; 88 in 1955 the successor commissioner repudiated the lease contracts as invalid, and the plaintiff instituted a proceeding to mandamus entry of the contracts upon the county minutes; in
1956, while the action was pending, the commissioner accepted a much
higher offer for the lease from another party.'
In only a "syllabus opinion," the supreme court reversed the trial
judge's dismissal of the plaintiff's action and emphasized the commissioner's "official duty" to enter such county contracts upon the minutes.1 7 For nonperformance, said the court, mandamus was the appropriate remedy "unless the applicant for such relief has with respect thereto
been guilty of gross laches or has permitted an unreasonable period of
time to elapse before applying to the proper court therefor."'" Rejecting
the commissioner's argument of an unreasonable 15-year delay in seeking
entry, the court noted the plaintiff's prompt demand and mandamus action upon learning of the commissioner's repudiation. 8 9 Thus, "there
[was] clearly no merit in the defendant's contention that the plaintiff,
because of its gross laches or unreasonable delay in applying therefor,
[was] not entitled to the relief sought."' 90
At a minimum, the decisions that an "invalid" and "unenforceable"
contract can be mandamused into a "valid" and "binding" contract would
appear to depend upon two prerequisites. First, there must be in exis182. 213 Ga. 38, 96 S.E.2d 889 (1957).
183. The plaintiff had made rental payments and deposits to the county.
184. The amendment simply changed the original lease in respect to amount of rent to
be paid and land included.
185. In his 1955 action, the plaintiff alleged that the government would reportedly vacate the premises within one year.
186. Indeed, a part of the commissioner's defense was that if the plaintiff's action was
successful, the county would be unable to perform its obligation to the later lessee.
187. 213 Ga. at 38, 96 S.E.2d at 891. The court also emphasized that the lease contracts
were only prima facie valid and that no further issue of their validity was to be considered
in this mandamus proceeding.
188. Id.
189. The plaintiff alleged that for several years he had no reason to suspect that the
contracts had not been entered, and that his mandamus action was initiated within two
weeks of the commissioner's definite refusal to record the contracts.
190. 213 Ga. at 39, 96 S.E.2d at 891.
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tence a written agreement; and second, the county must be present as a
party to that agreement. The absence of those elements controlled the
supreme court's consideration of Hatcher v. Hancock County Commissioners, 91 a physician's effort to mandamus the county's payment of a
breach-of-contract judgment against the county hospital authority.'"9 In
general, the court's treatment of the effort consisted of an inventory of
missing ingredients.'19 Although the plaintiff had entered into an employment contract with the hospital authority, he had not contracted with the
county commissioners. Although the contract was submitted to and approved by the commissioners, it was not entered upon the county minutes. Although the plaintiff possessed a valid and unhonored judgment
against the authority, that judgment was not a legal responsibility of the
commissioners. Finally, the court concluded,
[w]hile a person has a legal right to have a written contract made with
the county entered on the official minutes. . ., if the contracts are not in
writing and not entered on the proper minutes, they are not enforceable .... At the hearing, Dr. Hatcher produced no writing showing an
agreement between him and the Board of Commissioners. Therefore, he
could not compel its entry on the minutes. Any oral understanding between the parties was unenforceable.'"
C.

Qualifications

The supreme court opened the modern era by appearing to effect a
considerable expansion of the exception, crafted in the middle ages, for
county employment agreements not resting upon "contract." As crafted,
it will be recalled that the exception was rather severely restricted to
county "appointments" of "public officers," and highly selective as to precisely which appointments qualified. Some of those restrictions upon the
exception appeared to dissipate, however, with the court's 1955 decision
in First NationalBank v. Mann.'"s In that case, a county ordinary sought
to mandamus the county depository to pay the salaries of the ordinary,
her assistants, and her employees for a specified month. Although the salary schedules had been set by the county commissioner and approved by
the grand jury, as provided by statute, the depository contended the
schedules were illegal "for the reason that they were not entered on the
191. 239 Ga. 229, 236 S.E.2d 577 (1977).
192. The breach appeared unquestioned; the hospital authority had simply failed to pay
the physician's salary.
193. The court affirmed the trial judge's dismissal of the action.
194. 239 Ga. at 230-31, 236 S.E.2d at 579.
195. 211 Ga. 706, 88 S.E.2d 361 (1955).
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minutes of the county commissioner. '"19" Rejecting that contention, the
court's entire treatment of the written-and-entered mandate was as follows: "This section refers only to contracts, and the payment of salaries of
county officials and employees is not contractual within the provisions of
1
this act. "9

Both appellate courts later seized upon Mann in considering the plights
of workers whose services the county had terminated. In Deason v.
DeKalb County, 9' 8 for example, the supreme court held that a wrongfully
discharged county police officer was entitled to maintain an action against
the county for his wages."' Noting the plaintiff's allegation of permanentstatus employment by the county commissioners, the court discounted
the written-and-entered mandate by observing that "this court has held
that the payment of salaries of county officials and employees is not contractual within the provisions of this Act. ' 20 0 The court of appeals reacted
similarly in Polk County v. Anderson,'20 a salary action against the
20
county by a discharged county administrator: 2
The petition shows that the plaintiff was a county officer, the board having appointed him in the exercise of its implied authority conferred upon
it by the legislature to appoint an officer for a determinate term and salary to attend to the duties and business of the county. The law did not
require that his appointment be made by a contract in writing entered
20
upon the minutes. '
The period also embodied the supreme court's explicit exclusion of
county boards of education from coverage of the mandate. Wilson v.

196. Id. at 707, 88 S.E.2d at 363.
197. Id. at 707-08, 88 S.E.2d at 363 (emphasis supplied). The court reversed the trial
judge's issuance of the mandamus, but upon a different and unrelated point.
198. 222 Ga. 63, 148 S.E.2d 414 (1966).
199. The unlawfulness of the discharge had been previously judicially determined, and
the court specified that the employee was one "with tenure under a civil service or merit
system Act." Id. at 65, 148 S.E.2d at 416.
200. Id. at 66, 148 S.E.2d at 416.
201. 116 Ga. App. 546, 158 S.E.2d 315 (1967).
202. The county commissioners had appointed the plaintiff at a specified annual salary
for a term of two years and had then terminated his services after less than four months.
The plaintiff sued for the difference between the amount he would have received as salary
for the remainder of his employment and the amount he had received in other employment
during the term.
203. 116 Ga. App. at 546, 158 S.E.2d at 316. The court distinguished James v. Douglas
County, 131 Ga. 270, 62 S.E. 185 (1908), and Murray County v. Pickering, 42 Ga. App. 739,
157 S.E. 343 (1931), from the case at hand with the observation that in each of those cases
"the claimant against the county had not been appointed as a county officer but was employed only for a specific transaction or service." Id. For a discussion of these cases, see
notes 24-26 and 86-90, supra, and accompanying text.
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Strange'" originated in disagreements over a contract between two
school boards with respect to pupil attendance in the systems. 03 The defendants in the case urged that the contract was not properly approved or
recorded, and the plaintiff attempted to mandamus entry of the agreement upon the defendants' minutes. The court responded as follows:
A contract with the county commissioners must be in writing and must
be entered on the minutes of the proper authority in order to be enforceable ....
This section, however, does not apply to the County Board of
Education. We can find, and we have been cited, no authority requiring
the County Board of Education to enter its contracts on its minutes
before it is enforceable. Therefore, the trial court properly refused to issue the mandamus.'"6
As of 1979, the supreme court was continuing its apparent dilution of
the mandate, at least from a procedural perspective. PMS Construction
Co. v. DeKalb County 0 7 presented an action against the county for its
termination of a contract with the plaintiff to build a tennis center.'08 In
declaring the county susceptible to the action,109 the court conceded that
the plaintiff could not recover unless the county had breached "an authorized written contract, entered on the minutes.' 1 ' 0 The court also conceded that the plaintiff had failed to allege such an entry, and that "prior
to the adoption of the Civil Practice Act, a complaint without this allegation was subject to a general demurrer.' 1 ' Since the enactment of that
practice statute,"' however, the "pleading requirement" was no more:
Although a plaintiff may not recover from a county on a contract unless
the contract is on the minutes, this is a matter of proof at trial and not a
matter of pleading. If the contract is now on the minutes, PMS need only
show this at trial. If the contract has not yet been entered on the minutes, PMS is, of course, entitled to amend its complaint to seek mandamus for entry of the contract on the minutes. 2"'
204. 235 Ga. 156, 219 S.E.2d 88 (1975).
205. The contract was for a period of 25 years, and the court cited express constitutional
authority for it.
206. 235 Ga. at 161, 219 S.E.2d at 94.
207. 243 Ga. 870, 257 S.E.2d 285 (1979).
208. The complaint included counts for specific performance of the contract, the reasonable value of the plaintiff's work, and damages for breach.
209. This was an action on a contract made pursuant to legislative authorization.
210. 243 Ga. at 871, 257 S.E.2d at 287.
211. Id. The court cited as its example of the earlier rule James v. Douglas County, 131
Ga. 270, 62 S.E. 185 (1908). See notes 24-26, supra, and accompanying text.
212. GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-108 (1977).
213. 243 Ga. at 871, 257 S.E.2d at 287. The court further observed that because of the
statutory mandate, there could be no "implied contract" or "quantum meruit" recovery
against a county, but then proceeded to hold that an action for "restitution" was maintain-
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Finally, the modern era's more casual treatment of the mandate caught
up with the supreme court in the 1980 case of Lester Witte & Co. v. Rabun County.2 1 4 There the plaintiff partnership contracted to perform accounting services for the county, but the county minutes made no mention of a contractual reservation of the plaintiff's right to charge more
than the stated fee in unusual circumstances.2 5 Plaintiff alleged that individual county commissioners later orally agreed to excess work and fees,
but the county refused to pay the additional amount."'
In its action against the county, plaintiff first requested that the commissioners be mandamused to enter upon their minutes the oral authorization of the additional work. Affirming the trial judge's dismissal of that
request, the court reasoned as follows:
While it is true that at the mandamus stage the court cannot inquire
beneath the surface of a facially valid contract before ordering it placed
upon the minutes, in this case the alleged agreement authorizing the appellant to incur $10,000 in excess of the stated
contract price is not
217
prima facie valid because it is not in writing.
As for the plaintiff's reliance upon the decision in PMS Construction Co.,
21 8
the court drew the line:
The key distinction between PMS and this case is the existence of a written contract covering all the terms PMS sued on, whereas here the trial
court was correct in concluding that the oral modification Lester Witte &
Company sued on was an illegal and unenforceable agreement.2'
The plaintiff's alternative theory of recovery attempted to engage the
"public officer" exception. Plaintiff maintained that the effect of the
agreement was to appoint plaintiff the county auditor which "as a public
official was exempt from having its contract placed on the minutes."M20
Although denoting the argument an "appealing" one, the court wondered
"whether a partnership can hold the public office of appointed county
able. "Restitution is an alternative remedy which entitles a party whose express contract has
been breached or repudiated to recover the reasonable value of materials furnished and
services rendered, measured as of the time of performance, if certain conditions are met."
Id. at 872-73, 257 S.E.2d at 288.
214. 245 Ga. 382, 265 S.E.2d 4 (1980).
215. Although the contract contained the reservation, the court said that the county
minutes recited only the character of the work and the quoted prices.
216. The county contended that the only contract it had made was the one on the
minutes.
217. 245 Ga. at 384, 265 S.E.2d at 6.
218. The court noted that the PMS Constr. Co. decision had been a subject of discussion
during oral argument.
219. 245 Ga. at 386, 265 S.E.2d at 7.
220. Id. at 383, 265 S.E.2d at 5.
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auditor?" ' ' Highlighting the statutory requirement that a county officer
be a qualified voter,222 and declaring that a partnership can not be a qualified voter, the court concluded that the plaintiff was not a public officer
whose employment agreement was exempt from the written-and-entered
mandate. 2 '
D.

Summary

Perhaps the most impressive emanation from a survey of modern cases
dealing with the command that county contracts be written and entered
is an aura of vitality. In recent years, it appears, controversy over the
statutory mandate is as sharp as ever; and the requirement's judicial
evolution proceeds apace. In brief, one who deals with a county can realistically anticipate an encounter with the mandate.
Sales, services, purchases, easements, and bailments have all experienced the mandate's current application; and "implied contracts" are
rendered impossible.
At the same time, the judicial discovery of extenuating circumstances
continues. A county's attempt to repudiate one arrangement in order to
attain a more attractive one evokes genuine ambivalence from the courts.
At a minimum, however, even a mandamus to enter requires the existence
of a writing and the presence of a county as a party.
As for explicit exceptions, the courts have gone far to extract officer
and employee hiring arrangements from coverage; indeed, those arrangements are not deemed "contractual" in nature. Other exceptions are both
substantive and procedural in thrust. As to the former, county boards of
education are not covered entities; as to the latter, noncompliance with
the mandate is a matter for trial and not for pleading.
Clarification is proving an illusive goal.
V.

CONCLUSION

Of the legal requirements surrounding the local government contracting
process, few can claim a more ancient origin than the Georgia statutory
mandate that county contracts be in writing and entered upon the
county's minutes. For well over 100 years that mandate has signaled an
ominous caution to those who seek to effectuate understandings with
counties and, in a spectrum of settings, has loomed as a dramatic focal
point for litigation.
Even a non-exhaustive survey of appellate court decisions yields several
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 385, 265 S.E.2d at 7.
GA. CODE ANN.

§ 89-101(7) (1980).

Chief Justice Nichols and Justice Hill dissented without opinions.
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analytical impressions. First, in the life of the mandate's judicial evolution there appear to be roughly three historical epochs: a formative period, a transition period, and a modern period. Second, during each of
those periods the issues presented and decided lend themselves to substantive organization depicting the mandate's application, the status of a
covered agreement, and possible qualifications upon the rule. Finally, at
every turn there is the constant and debilitating tension between the
mandate's perceived purpose of fostering effective county government
and the perilous plight in which the mandate's application frequently
leaves the other party to the contract. On occasion, the judicial ambivalence is resounding.
Although clarification on several scores would be beneficial, at least two
conclusions are obvious: this century-old mandate remains a central point
of controversy in Georgia county law today, and in instances where the
mandate is applicable, its ramifications are nothing short of traumatic.

